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The determinants of the UK Big Firm premium 
Abstract 
Our study attempts to determine whether, and if so why, the large auditing firms are able to earn 
a premium on their audit work in the UK. We start by confirming the apparent existence of a 
Big Firm premium during the period 1985-2002. We examine industry specialisation, non-audit 
service fee and monopoly pricing explanations for the premium. The results of our tests of 
industry specialization are mixed. There is little evidence that this premium is associated with 
industry specialization when specialists are defined at the national level. Significant premia are 
observed if specialization is defined at the city level, particularly if the auditor is the industry 
leader. However, when appropriate allowance is made for endogeneity, by modelling both audit 
and non-audit fees in a simultaneous equations framework, the Big Firm premium disappears. 
We find evidence to suggest that non-audit fees earned by auditors from their audit clients are 
positively related to the size of the audit fee and vice versa. Finally, when the sample is stratified 
by the size of audit client, we find no systematic evidence of anticompetitive pricing.  
 
 2 
 
 
 
The determinants of the UK Big Firm premium 
 
1. Introduction 
A series of mergers and takeovers have radically changed the market for professional accounting 
services over the last twenty years. There were eight international UK firms in 1985 (Arthur 
Andersen, Arthur Young, Coopers and Lybrand, Ernst and Whinney, Deloitte Haskins and Sells, 
Peat Marwick, Price Waterhouse and Touche Ross). In 1986, Peat Marwick merged with KMG 
Thompson McLintock to form the firm that is known today as KPMG. The UK mergers in 1989 
between Ernst and Whinney and Arthur Young and in 1990 between Deloitte, Haskins and Sells 
and Coopers and Lybrand (Touche Ross in the US) reduced the number of dominant firms to 
six. The merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand in 1997 cut this number to 
five. Following the Enron debacle, the takeover of Andersen by Deloitte resulted in four Big 
Firms. Although these structural changes have contributed to increased concentration ratios in 
the audit market (Wolk et al., 2001), the effect on audit fees is unclear.   
Several studies have provided evidence of the existence of a Big Firm audit fee premium 
in the US, Australia, Hong Kong and Malaysia.1  However, the UK evidence is mixed. Studies 
by Taffler and Ramalinggam (1982), Chan et al. (1993), Pong and Whittington (1994) and 
Ezzamel et al. (1996) find the premium is significant, whereas Brinn et al. (1994), O’Sullivan 
(1998) and Ezzamel et al. (2002) do not. The purposes of the present study are twofold. One is 
to model the pricing of accounting services over a longer period (1985-2002) than in previous 
studies, one that encompasses notable contractions in the number of Big Firms.  The other is to 
provide a systematic examination of the factors that might lead to higher audit fees being 
charged by Big Firms. 
Our initial results are consistent with much earlier research in finding that Big Firms 
appear to earn a premium in the UK when due allowance is made for factors like the size, 
complexity and riskiness of a client’s business. We also find evidence to suggest that the Big 
Firm premium is statistically significant from 1986 to 1998 but seems to fall away afterwards. 
The reasons for the decline are unclear.      
One possibility is that the Big Firm premium is attributable to large audit firms devoting 
resources to developing industry expertise, making them better auditors in the industries in 
                                                 
1 US studies include Palmrose (1986a,b), Francis and Simon (1987), Baber et al. (1987), Simon and Francis (1988), 
Turpen (1990), Beatty (1993) and Ward et al. (1994). Work dealing with Australia has been done by Francis 
(1984), Francis and Stokes (1986) and Butterworth and Houghton (1995). For similar findings covering Hong Kong 
and Malaysia, see Simon et al. (1992) and DeFond et al. (2000).  An overall assessment of the international audit 
pricing literature is provided by Moizer (1997). 
 3 
 
 
 
question. We explore this possibility much more exhaustively than in earlier studies, measuring 
industry specialization in a variety of ways and find that the results are mixed. If specialization 
is defined at the national level, we find that the Big Firm premium generally remains intact. 
Recent studies document that the industry leaders or industry specialists defined at the city-level 
enjoy a fee premium over other firms (DeFond et al., 2000; Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 
2005). Using these definitions, we find evidence to suggest that the Big Firm premium could be 
attributable to industry specialization by auditors. 
Another possibility we consider is that the Big Firm premium arises from big accounting 
firms being able to retain knowledge spillovers they obtain from providing consulting services 
to clients. We find that when income from non-audit services (NAS) provided to the audit client 
is included in the audit fee model, the coefficient on NAS is significant but the Big Firm 
premium seems to disappear. However, the picture changes when allowance is made for the 
possible endogeneity of audit and NAS by modelling both sources of audit firm revenue in a 
simultaneous equations framework. Whisenant et al. (2003) apart, prior research has not 
explicitly addressed this endogeneity issue. When allowance is made for endogeneity, we find 
that NAS is an increasing function of the audit fee and that audit fee is also increasing in NAS. 
From this we conclude that the audit and NAS fees could be jointly determined in a way that 
enhances the returns of audit firms: Big firms appear to charge a premium for their audit 
services as a result of the “one-stop shopping” they provide. 
Finally, we carry out a number of additional tests to try to throw light on the 
competitiveness of the UK audit market. Following several high profile mergers, the Big Firms 
have increased their share of the audit market. Market concentration is particularly high for 
companies of above-average size, possibly because large audit firms have a technological 
advantage in auditing large clients. This raises the possibility that the Big Firm premium might 
be attributable to tacit or non-tacit price collusion in this segment (Sullivan (2002)). We 
examine the level of competition in the UK audit market by testing whether the size of the Big 
Firm premium differs across four sub-samples of clients stratified by size. Although the results 
indicate that accounting firms do not systematically engage in anticompetitive pricing, the Big 
Firm premium appears to be more prevalent for the lower size quartiles than the upper size 
quartiles. This result suggests that competition is strong in the market for prestigious clients but 
smaller companies must pay a premium to secure the services of a quality-differentiated firm. 
The remainder of this study of the determinants of the Big Firm premium is organised in 
the following manner. Section 2 summarises the research, theoretical and methodological issues 
relating to quality differentiated audits. We address industry specialization in section 3, non-
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audit services in section 4 and monopoly pricing in section 5. Our empirical results are reported 
in sections 6. A summary and our conclusions are presented in the final section. 
 
2. Quality-Differentiated Audits 
We begin our analysis of what constitutes the assumed Big Firm premium by considering 
quality differentiation. The three interrelated sources of demand for quality-differentiated audits 
are agency demand, information demand and insurance demand (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995). 
Agency demand, first detailed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), explains the demand for an audit 
in terms of a bonding mechanism that reduces the agency costs, such as the over-consumption of 
perks, that result from the self-interested actions of agents. The information demand addresses 
the circumstances when management might seek to use particularly creditable auditors in order 
to signal their own honesty and integrity (Dopuch and Simunic, 1980). The insurance demand 
for an audit refers to the avenue an audit opens up for investors and creditors to seek redress 
from the auditor for any losses they might suffer as a result of audit failures, with higher quality 
auditors having more insurance capacity. Differences in client circumstances lead to a demand 
for quality-differentiated audits.  
The supply of quality-differentiated audits can be motivated by the theory of product 
differentiation (Simunic and Stein, 1987). Firms with greater expertise, credibility and audit 
quality will gain market share by “word of mouth” advertising (Mercer, 1992; Rogerson, 1983). 
Consumers use the quality of an earlier product as an indicator of present and future quality 
(Mercer, 1992; Shapiro, 1983). Firms have no incentive to reduce quality if consumers quickly 
become aware of the degradation of the product. Audits pose practical problems for the product 
differentiation theory because of the difficulties of discerning product quality. Audit quality is 
likely to be judged on the basis of observable supplier characteristics, such as the firm’s size and 
name (Dopuch and Simunic, 1980). Reputable firms will produce high quality audits because 
consumers recognise and reward the investment (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Palmrose, 1986a)2 
unless the costs of such investments are the same for both high-quality and low-quality auditors, 
resulting in a “market for lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). The sheer scale of reputational investments 
can serve as a costly signal that might prevent such a pooling equilibrium. Rents can arise due to 
auditor start up costs and client switching costs and these serve as a “bond” on independence 
and audit quality (Francis and Wilson, 1988). Reputable firms have more incentives to produce 
                                                 
2 Some examples of such investments include Price Waterhouse’s Blue Chip Portfolio, the Coopers and Lybrand 
Audit Support System (CLASS), KPMG’s Audit 2000 and Ernst and Young’s Audit Innovation. 
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quality audits and maintain independence because they have large market shares (Craswell and 
Taylor, 1991) and the most specialised intangible assets at risk (Ritson et al., 1997), and they are 
able to extract economic rents as a result (DeAngelo, 1981). 
Most audit pricing studies estimate cross-sectional models using a small sample of data. 
We test for quality differentiation (model 1) over a wider time frame than in previous studies 
and use the panel data method that captures the time-series aspect of our data and can help 
reduce multicollinearity, as well as control for omitted variables (Hsaio, 1986)3. We test whether 
the possession of a Big Firm brand name is a source of enhanced revenue in the audit market 
using the following generic model: 
 .  + Brand  + ontrols)(  +   = 210 εββα CLAF                                               (1) 
The dependent variable, LAF, is the natural logarithm of audit fees and the experimental (test) 
variable, Brand, is an indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is a Big Firm and zero 
otherwise. Controls are a vector of proxies for client size (assets or revenue), litigation risk (long 
term debt to assets, return on investment, current and quick ratios), complexity (domestic and 
foreign subsidiaries ratios) and the opportunity cost of audit labour (whether the financial year 
end falls in the busy period).  These control variables have been used in other studies to capture 
the majority of the work-related variation in audit fees (e.g. Francis, 1984; Francis and Stokes, 
1986; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Simon et al., 1992; 
Beatty, 1993; Anderson and Zeghal, 1994; Brinn et al., 1994; Craswell et al., 1995; DeFond et 
al., 2000; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2003).  Based on that prior literature, we 
expect all these control variables to be positively associated with audit fees, with the exception 
of two risk proxies (Current Ratio and Return on Investment). 
 
 
3. Industry Specialization 
The Big Firm premium might also be explained by returns to industry specialist reputations. 
Audit firms promote themselves as industry specialists (Zeff and Fossum, 1967; Rhode et al., 
1974; Danos and Eichenseher, 1981, 1982; Eichenseher and Danos, 1981), using the popular 
press and their websites to advertise their expertise in specific industries and to claim to provide 
a higher quality service and greater value (Berton, 1995; Dunn et al. 2000). DeAngelo (1981) 
defines quality as the auditor’s ability to “discover errors or breaches in the accounting system 
and withstand client pressures to disclose selectively in the event a breach is discovered”. The 
                                                 
3 One audit pricing study that has used the panel data method is the analysis of the determinants of audit lags by 
Henderson and Kaplan (2000). We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
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quality differentiation claims made by the Big Firms can be viewed using agency and costly 
contracting theories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Watts and Zimmerman, 1983, 1986) as 
service differentials that give rise to returns to brand name and industry specialization 
reputations. To the extent that their clients’ control systems and financial statements are industry 
specific, industry specialization could lead to higher levels of audit performance and expertise 
beyond the generic level mandated by statute (Shockley and Holt, 1983; Palmrose, 1984; 
Bonner and Lewis, 1990; Ashton, 1991). Accounting firms might expect positive returns to their 
investment in specialization (Craswell et al., 1995) if audit clients benefit from significant 
reductions in the aforementioned industry-specific agency costs.  
Theory about the influence of industry specialization on audit fees is inconclusive. Audit 
firms will only develop an industry specialist reputation if it increases the credibility of financial 
reporting and attracts clients. Industry specialization might do this if it creates knowledge of 
industry-specific audit risks that can be used on different audit assignments in the industry. The 
specialist knowledge could introduce production economies of scale into the audit process 
(O’Keefe et al., 1994), transforming the auditors involved into more efficient, lower-cost 
producers of audits (Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Danos and Eichenseher, 1986; and Craswell 
et al., 1995). The resulting production economies of scale are passed on to clients if competitive 
pressures are such as to induce the industry specialists to charge lower relative audit fees 
(Palmrose, 1986a). The economies-of-scale argument could be strongest in the case of medium-
sized audit firms if there is a clientele that demands the lowest priced audit available and if 
medium-sized firms are lower-cost service providers. Medium-sized firms might choose to 
specialise in order to generate economies of scale that will provide them with a cost advantage 
in this market sector and enable them to charge lower fees and gain market share (DeFond et al., 
2000). This ambiguity could explain why prior research has been inconclusive (Krishnan and 
Yang, 1998).  
Although empirical studies estimate the significance of brand name and industry-
specialist returns, the design of appropriate tests for industry specialization is fraught with 
difficulty, little or no attention has been paid to industry size and the theoretical rationalisation is 
undeveloped. Industry specialist expertise is generated when a key individual, a group of people 
of differing ranks or a set of audit partners focus their training and experiences in the field of 
interest and invest significant resources in the study of legal regulations, production processes 
and market behaviour of key players. Audit firms will invest resources in the creation of an 
industry specialist reputation if there are sufficient clients willing to pay higher fees that will 
cover this additional investment. It could be uneconomical for any auditor to develop expertise 
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in small sectors, whereas several firms might find it worthwhile to specialise in large sectors. 
Recent research suggests that industry expertise could be developed at the city level rather than 
on a national scale (Ferguson et al., 2003)4 and that the industry leader might earn a fee 
premium over other firms (DeFond et al., 2000; Francis et al., 2005). We build our research 
design on the notion that industry size matters and partition across industry sectors before 
defining both city-based and national-level specialists.  
Most prior studies test for specialization as a differentiating feature between auditors5 
using a simple measure of specialization derived from the audit firm’s share of the market in a 
particular industry (Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Craswell et al., 1995; Palmrose, 1986a; 
Craswell and Taylor, 1991). However, a single market-based measure of industry specialization 
does not provide for a robust test and introduces a bias towards large accounting firms 
(Krishnan, 2001). Australian studies report both significant (Craswell et al., 1995) and 
insignificant industry-specialist returns (Ferguson and Stokes, 2002). US writers find that 
industry specialization does not have a significant effect on audit fees (Palmrose, 1986a; 
Pearson and Trompeter, 1994). In Hong Kong, industry specialization has a significant positive 
impact on the fees charged by the international accounting firms but a significant negative 
impact on the fees charged by their smaller counterparts (DeFond et al., 2000). These disparate 
results reflect the inconclusive state of theory, differences in auditing regimes in different 
countries, unusual descriptive statistics6 and different research methodologies.    
We address some of these measurement issues with design enhancements. We test 
whether the Big Firm premium could be explained by returns to industry specialist reputations 
by capturing investment in industry specialist expertise using multiple measures of the auditor’s 
share of the sales revenue and audit fees of clients in an industry (Krishnan and Yang, 1998). 
We do this in a number of ways. 
First, to facilitate comparison with prior work, we follow Craswell et al. (1995) and 
DeFond et al. (2000) and define specialists in terms of a dichotomous measure of the auditor’s 
share of the audit fees of clients in an industry (DDF). We then extend this line of thought by 
further defining specialism in three different ways: (i) a dichotomous measure of the auditor’s 
                                                 
4 Ferguson et al., (2003: 429) observe an average premium of 24 percent if the auditor is both the city-specific 
leader and one of the two leading national firms in the industry. This premium disappears if the two leading 
national firms are not city leaders. 
5 The extant literature has viewed industry specialization premium as a differentiating feature amongst the (usually) 
Big Firms. This study investigates a different question - whether the Big Firms premium can be attributed to returns 
to industry specialist reputations. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.  
6 Krishnan (2001) attributes these disparities to “different bases …[that] yield different rankings of specialists”. The 
mean acid test ratio found by Craswell et al. 1995 (5.828) and the peculiar mean current and quick ratios reported 
by DeFond et al. 2000 (0.447 and 2.157) cast doubt about the generalisability of their results.  
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share of the client’s sales revenue in an industry (DDR); (ii) a continuous measure of the 
auditor’s share of the audit fees of clients in an industry (CDF), and (iii) a continuous measure 
of the auditor’s share of the sales revenue of clients in an industry (CDR). We test whether small 
firms devote a substantial percentage of their resources to one industry, using both continuous 
and dichotomous measures of the audit firm’s share of their portfolio in an industry. We adopt 
the specialist definition which focuses on dichotomous measures of the audit firm’s share of the 
audit fees of clients in their portfolio within an industry (DAF) and dichotomous measures of 
the audit firm’s share of the sales revenue of clients in their portfolio in an industry (DAR). We 
extend this line of argument by defining specialists using a continuous measure of the audit 
firm’s share of the audit fees of clients in their portfolio in an industry (CAF) and a continuous 
measure of the audit firm’s share of the sales revenue of clients in their portfolio in an industry 
(CAR). Finally, perceptions of industry specialization are estimated using a dichotomous 
dummy that indicated whether the audit firm has promoted itself as a specialist in the industry 
(DFP). Details of the methods used to estimate DDF, DDR, CDF, CDR, DAF, DAR, CAF, CAR 
and DFP industry specialists are contained in the Appendix. 
We use these multiple definitions at both the national and city level to test whether 
industry specialization might be a source of enhanced revenue in the audit market and whether 
firms with a brand name can enhance their audit revenues through industry specialization. We 
extend Palmrose (1986a) by testing for returns to brand name, non-Big Firm industry 
specialization and Big Firm industry specialization reputations in a single OLS regression 
(model 2). By expanding model (1) to form model (2), we can jointly test for non-Big Firm and 
Big Firm industry specialization: 
.  + Spec BF  + NBFSpec  + Brand  + (Controls) +   = 43210 εββββαLAF             (2) 
where: 
NBFSpec = auditor indicator variable, 1 indicates a Non-Big Firm specialist, 0 otherwise,  
BFSpec = auditor indicator variable, 1 indicates a Big Firm specialist, 0 otherwise. 
We follow this by replicating the basic design of Craswell et al. (1995), creating sub-
samples of specialist and non-specialist auditor client industries (models 1 and 3). Model 1 is 
used to estimate brand name returns in non-specialist industries and then again by removing the 
specialist auditors in industries where such specialists exist. Model 3 computes industry 
specialization returns by excluding the small and medium sized non-specialists and comparing 
specialist fees with Big Firm non-specialist fees:  
. + Spec  + Controls)(  +   = 210 εββαLAF                                                   (3) 
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where Spec is an auditor indicator variable, set equal to one if the audit firm is an industry 
specialist, and zero otherwise, 
 
4. Non-Audit Services 
The Big Firm premium might be explained in terms of interdependence between the fees 
charged by auditors for audit and non-audit services. One rationale for the joint provision of 
audit and NAS by accounting firms is the existence of economies of scope generated by the two 
services in association with “knowledge spillovers” (Simunic, 1984; Antle et al., 1997; 
Whisenant et al., 2003). Knowledge spillovers are a form of external economy “arising from 
providing audits and NAS as joint products” (Abdel-khalik, 1990, 296). These could be 
generated if “the total costs of one firm jointly performing both non-auditing and auditing 
services are less than the sum of the costs when each service is performed by a different firm” 
(DeBerg et al., 1991: 20). If NAS can be purchased from the incumbent auditor, a client’s search 
and other transactions costs should also be reduced (Simunic, 1984). While the provision of 
NAS could threaten audit independence (and hence audit quality), joint provision is likely to be 
more cost-efficient (Simunic, 1984). Moreover, most of the existing empirical papers document 
a positive association between audit and NAS fees when a simple OLS model is used (Simunic, 
1984; Simon, 1985; Abdel-Khalik, 1990; Turpen, 1990; Barkess and Simnett, 1994; Butterworth 
and Houghton, 1995; Ezzamel et al., 1996; Firth, 1997; Craswell and Francis 1999; Ezzamel et 
al., 2002; Firth, 2002). This raises concerns as to whether it is appropriate to treat assurance 
services and other services provided by audit firms as though they are independent (Simunic, 
1984; Beck et al., 1988; Abdel-Khalik, 1990; Bartlett, 1993; Davis et al., 1993; Lowenstein, 
2002; Malkiel, 2002). 
A number of explanations have been offered for the observed positive association 
between audit and NAS fees. Simunic (1984) and Firth (2002) argue that the joint supply of 
audit and NAS reduces the price per unit of audit services; so assuming that demand for audit 
services is price-elastic, clients demand more audit services leading to an increase in total audit 
fees. This strongly suggests that the relationship between the fees for audit and NAS work 
should be modelled simultaneously, rather than treating NAS as exogenous, as has been done in 
prior work. It is important to note in this regard that clients in difficulty might demand more 
NAS, which might in turn lead to a higher audit fee because of the greater risk or work involved 
(Simunic, 1984). Alternatively, some client-specific events might generate a demand for 
consultancy services and necessitate additional auditing (Ezzamel et al., 2002; and Firth, 2002). 
Firth (2002) contends that mergers and acquisitions, share issues, new accounting and 
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information systems, new CEOs and corporate restructurings might require additional audit and 
NAS work. Furthermore, Solomon (1989) argues that NAS might lead to a change in the client’s 
organisation that increases the demand for audit services, the NAS market could be 
uncompetitive, or audit partners might capture part of the NAS fee for themselves. Accounting 
firms have promoted themselves as global or ‘one stop’ service providers. Brand name firms 
capable of providing NAS as well as audit might have a marketing advantage over other auditors 
in terms of the provision of all of the additional services that are demanded by a client. Concerns 
have been expressed that the audit service has become increasingly marginalised in the quest for 
more profitable NAS work, leading to the possibility that the price for audit work declines as 
NAS business increases (Zeff, 1998; Jeppesen, 1998).  
These factors suggest that the measurement of any Big Firm premium needs to take 
account of the potential endogeneity of NAS. Whisenant et al. (2003) argue that to the extent 
that audit and NAS fees are jointly determined, the residuals will be correlated and single-
equation estimations violate the independent error term assumption of OLS. However, although 
there are clear a priori reasons to expect audit and NAS fees to be endogenous and the literature 
on audit and NAS pricing suggests that the services are interrelated, Whisenant et al. (2003) is 
the only published study that incorporates simultaneous equation models into the pricing of 
accounting services. We remedy this deficiency by testing for endogeneity and investigating the 
extent any simultaneous equation bias affects inferences by estimating the fee relationship using 
both OLS (model 4) and simultaneous equation (models 4 and 5): 
.    LNAS  Brand +Controls)(  +   = 3210 εβββα ++LAF                                       (4) 
.  LAF  Brand  (Controls)     3210 εβββα ++++=LNAS                                         (5) 
where LNAS is the natural logarithm of NAS fees (£’000).  
 
5. Monopoly Pricing 
Evidence that the Big Firm premium could be attributable to monopoly pricing would have 
significant implications for regulatory bodies, accounting firms and audit clients. Critics contend 
that the Big Firms have used their dominant market position to create entry barriers and thereby 
charge excessive fees. For example, Gist and Michaels (1995) call for a change in the structure 
of the market, stating: “it is obvious that some form of intervention is necessary as the market 
and free enterprise system cannot be relied upon to remedy the oligopolistic or monopolistic 
abuses in the profession”. These concerns have troubled researchers for many years (Stigler, 
1968: 30; Gist and Michaels, 1995: 233; Romeo, 1999: 62) but have grown more strident in the 
light of the Enron debacle and the resultant reduction to a Big Four. Although concentration 
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ratios have increased (e.g. Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Danos and Eichenseher, 1986; Hogan 
and Jeter, 1999; and Wolk et al., 2001), no systematic evidence of market abuse has appeared in 
the literature7. Consistent with this, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the Office of 
Fair Trading in the UK and the Department of Justice in the USA did not oppose the recent 
mergers of major accounting firms. The American evidence is that competition was largely 
unaffected by the mergers in 1989-1990 (Minyard and Tabor, 1991; Tonge and Wootton, 1991) 
and there has been no evidence of anti-competitive behaviour (Simunic, 1980; Lee, 1996; and 
Sullivan, 2002). The Office of Fair Trading (2001) appointed an independent body - the Law 
and Economics Consultant Group  (LECG) - to assess competition in the architecture, law and 
accountancy professions. Their survey noted the high concentration levels but stated: “LECG 
…have not found evidence of cartel activity among the professions examined.” Likewise, 
academic research has not uncovered evidence of an anticompetitive market (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Francis and Simon, 1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Roberts et al., 1990; Turpen, 1990; Pearson 
and Trompeter, 1994; and Craswell and Francis, 1999). One explanation for this disparity of 
opinion is that some segments of the market could be more competitive than others (Simunic 
1980). We analyse the effect of increasing concentration levels on audit pricing by estimating 
the Big Firm premium (model 1) across four quartiles of clients partitioned by total assets.  
 
 
6. Data Collection 
The sample comprises UK firms for the period 1985-2002. Variable definitions and sources of 
data used to measure them are set out in Table 1. We collected total assets, debt, earnings before 
interest and tax, financial year end, quick ratio, current ratio, operating profit, share issue and 
industry listing code data from the Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage and Thomson Analytics 
Worldscope databases. We collected audit and NAS fee data (mandated for years ending on or 
after 30 September 1992) from the Datastream International, Extel Company Research and 
Thomson Analytics Worldscope databases. Subsidiary and auditor identity data were collated by 
hand from hard copies of the published financial statements and the International Stock 
Exchange yearbook. Financial clients were removed because the very different nature of their 
business makes interpretation of their financial statements and ratios problematic and their 
different regulatory environments might result in different costs for their auditors relative to 
those of industrials.  
                                                 
7 High concentration ratios are usually explained as a form of product differentiation and concerns over market 
power “should be treated with scepticism” (Craswell and Taylor, 1991: 74). 
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-Insert Table 1 about here- 
 
We trimmed the sample to eliminate extreme observations in the first and last percentiles 
of total assets, total debt, operating profit, earnings before interest and tax, audit fees and NAS 
fees. However, the key results are not materially different if the outliers are Winsorised or 
included in the sample. These procedures produced a panel of 180 clients covering the period 
1985-2002, giving 180×18 = 3,240 firm-year observations.  
Consistent with other studies, the audit fee and NAS variables are expressed in 
logarithmic form in order to reduce their skewness and to prevent the largest clients from unduly 
influencing the results. The size proxy is similarly transformed, and a square root transformation 
was applied to the complexity variable (the number of UK subsidiaries).  As can be seen from 
Table 2, the assets, audit and NAS fee variables are well behaved after transformation. The 
mean and median Current and Quick ratios are similar to the figures the financial statement 
literature might lead one to expect, unlike the mean acid test ratio (5.828) found by Craswell et 
al. (1995) and the mean current and quick ratios (0.447 and 2.157) quoted by DeFond et al. 
(2000). Untabulated analyses reveal that the LAF, LNAS and LTA variables increased over the 
period, suggesting that clients grew in size and paid higher fees. The concentration ratio rose 
from 62.4% in 1985 to 86.6% in 2002, indicating a trend by clients to switch to Big Firm 
auditors. Untabulated correlation coefficient estimates are all below the critical value (0.8) 
suggested by Judge et al. (1988: 868). We computed variance inflation factors (VIF’s) for the 
only correlations of any magnitude (Current with Quick and LTA with Sub), but since the VIF’s 
were well below the conventional cut-off point of 10 (Hair et al., 1998: 193), we conclude that 
our results are not likely to be materially affected by multicollinearity amongst the explanatory 
variables. 
 
- Insert Table 2 about here - 
 
7. Results 
To make the results section concise and interpretable, we tabulate annual and panel regression 
results and Fama McBeth (1973) t-statistics for the areas of greatest interest. Since there is some 
evidence of heteroskedasticity, t-values are based on corrected standard errors using the White 
(1980) procedure. Coefficients that are significant at the five percent level or better are shown in 
bold type. 
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7.1 Quality Differentiation Tests 
The results of the yearly Big Firm premium estimation (model 1) are documented in Table 3. 
Almost all of the control variables display the predicted sign, with LTA, Sub, Current and 
Foreign providing the most explanatory power. Consistent with many prior studies, the 
coefficient on the Brand variable is significant in most years – in all years between 1986 and 
1998, but not in 1985 and not after 1998.  
The magnitude of the Big Firm premium can be estimated from these results in the 
following manner. Denote the expected value of Big Firm audit fees as 
][][log 10 ControlsELAFEAFbig βα +==                                        (6) 
and the expected value of non-Big firm audit fees as  
][][log 10 ControlsELAFEAFsmall βα +== .                                            (7) 
Defining the Big Firm premium as the proportionate increase in fees associated with engaging a 
major firm as the auditor, due allowance being made for work-related differences in fees, it 
follows from equations (6) and (7) that (after undoing the logarithmic transformation) the 
premium can be derived from the estimate of the Brand coefficient as 
.12 −=− βe
AF
AFAF
small
smallbig                                                         (8) 
Using equation (8), annual estimates of the Big Firm premium are given in the final column of 
Table 3.  We set the premium equal to zero in the years when the Brand coefficient was not 
statistically significant. It can be seen from the table that the Big Firm premium estimates 
generally fluctuated in the range 15-20% over the period 1985-1996, except for 1985 (0%) and 
1987 (26%). The Big Firm premium increased abruptly to 30.2% in 1997 and 33.9% in 1998, 
after which it became indistinguishable from zero. 
 
- Insert Table 3 about here – 
 
Table 4 documents the results for a pooled time- and firm-fixed-effects model that contains 
the previous control variables, the Brand dummy and a Brand-year interaction variable for each 
of the years 1986-2002 inclusive. A fixed-effects model has the advantage of controlling for 
firm-specific omitted factors that might confound the results in the annual cross-sectional 
regressions. The fixed-effects estimation allows one to see how the premium varies through time 
vis-à-vis the benchmark year (1985). The Brand coefficient is significant and positive, 
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indicating the existence of a Big Firm premium in 1985. This contrasts with the annual 
regression results reported in Table 3, where the Brand coefficient was not significant in that 
year8. The Brand-year interaction variables had significant positive coefficients in the years 
1987, 1992, 1994, 1997 and 1998, indicating that the premium was larger in those years than in 
1985. These findings might suggest (but see below) that the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger 
enabled the Big Firms to increase audit fees in the years 1997 and 1998. Over the last four years 
of the sample period, the audit fee premium falls back to the 1985 level in the fixed effect model 
and is insignificant in the annual estimations. This reduction in the premium might be 
attributable to the high profile scandals or the considerable regulatory and political upheaval in 
the market for professional services. However, since these explanations are not grounded in 
academic theory, we do not seek to explain how the sources of the Big Firms premium have 
evolved over time in this paper.  
 
-Insert Table 4 about here – 
 
An indication of the economic significance of these results is shown in the Premium column 
in Table 4. As before, the magnitudes of the Big Firm premia are computed by reference to 
equation (8) and indicate the percentage difference in audit fees with and without the audit being 
carried out by one of the major firms.  Again, when the relevant Brand coefficient was not 
statistically significant, the premium is set equal to zero.  The premium was 21.2% in 1985, 
which is pretty much the average level reported for the annual regressions in Table 3. The 
premium increased by only about one percent in some of the later years, and it never fell from 
the 1985 level, suggesting that too much should not be made of the likely effects of the mergers 
and scandals on fee levels.  Whatever is the source of the Big Firm premium, it appears to have 
been a temporally stable phenomenon.  We turn now to consider some of those factors.      
 
7.2 Brand Name and Industry Specialization Tests 
The brand name and industry specialization OLS estimates (models 2-3) appear in Tables 5 and 
6. The variable Spec refers to whether or not the auditor meets our definition of being a 
specialist in the client’s industry. The NBFSpec and BFSpec variables capture a Non-Big Firm 
                                                 
8 Why this is so is not entirely clear. We conjecture that the difference is due to the fixed effects model having a 
stronger explanatory power than the annual regressions because of its greater number of degrees of freedom, 
coupled with its controls for possibly confounding unmodelled firm-and-year factors.  This would account for why 
the fixed effects model is able to pick up the brand name effect in 1985 that the annual estimation just fails to do at 
the ten percent level. 
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or a Big Firm that is an industry specialist. In the case of the DDF and DDR definitions of 
industry specialization, the industry must pass a size criterion (contain at least 30 companies) 
and be important to the firm in terms of its share of industry audit fees or the extent to which it 
is reliant on the industry for revenue, respectively. The DAR and DAF definitions focus on how 
big a proportion of the auditor’s business comes from the client’s industry. These are researcher-
derived measures of industry specialization. In contrast, DFP refers to whether the auditor 
promotes itself as a specialist in that particular industry. The CDF and CDR definitions are 
continuous measures of the extent to which the firm is reliant on the industry for audit fees and 
revenue, respectively. CAR and CAF are researcher-derived measures of the concentration of 
the auditor’s business from the client’s industry.9 Control variables are included in the 
regressions but are not reported because the coefficients are similar in magnitude to those 
reported in tables 3 and 4. As discussed in section 3, we jointly estimate brand name and 
specialization returns (Brand, NBFSpec and BFSpec in model 2) for the Palmrose (1986a) 
replications. For the Craswell et al. (1995) methodology, we create sub-samples of specialist and 
non-specialist auditors and estimate returns to brand name (model 1) separately from industry 
specialization returns (Spec in model 3). Since brand is invariably significant, only the 
statistically significant Spec variables are tabulated. 
Our analysis shows that returns are generally not significant for industry specialists 
defined at the national level. The results in Table 5 indicate significant returns when 
specialization is defined by reference to a firm’s share of the industry’s clients and audit fees 
(DDF). However, the other ways of defining specialization all fail to yield significant results. 
The coefficient on Brand is significant but the coefficients on NBFSpec and BFSpec are almost 
invariably insignificant, suggesting that it is not simply a return to national-level industry 
specialist reputations. The results in Table 6 show that returns could be significant if industry 
specialization is defined at the city-level.10 We observe significant results when specialization is 
defined by reference to a firm’s share of the industry clients, fees and revenues (i.e., DDF and 
                                                 
9 All the regressions include Brand, which is the Big Firm indicator variable, and one of nine ways of defining an 
industry (DDF, DAF, DDR, DAR, DFP, CDF, CAF, CDR and CAR). Both Big Firms and medium sized ones 
register DDF, DAF and DAR industry specializations throughout the period, but medium sized firms fail to meet 
the DDR and DFP criteria in a number of years. To avoid collinearity problems and to facilitate consistent 
comparison of the results across time, BFspec is included in all of the DDF, DAF and DAR regressions but is not 
reported for the other estimations. However, the results in the years that medium sized firms meet the DDR and 
DFP criteria are not dissimilar to those reported.  
10 This is consistent with the behavioural study carried out by Simnett and Wright (2005) in a Big 4 firm into the 
knowledge required by auditors specialising in the insurance industry. They found that on-the-job experience was 
the most prevalent method of audit personnel gaining industry specialist knowledge. If the tacit knowledge of 
individual auditors is the most important source of industry expertise, this will generally reside at the city office 
level rather than be spread equally across all of a firm’s offices.   
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DDR), share of the auditor’s business that comes from the client’s industry (DAF) and its 
importance to the firm’s revenues (i.e., CAR). The other ways of defining specialization fail to 
yield significant results. Moreover, additional untabulated results indicate that the returns to 
city-level industry specialization are greater if the specialist is restricted to the market leader.  
 
-Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here- 
 
The implications of our findings are that the Big Firm premium could be attributable to 
brand names, cannot be credited to national-level industry specialist returns, but might be driven 
by city-level industry specialist returns. The evidence that returns to industry specialisation are 
significant at the city level but insignificant at the national level differs from existing research 
that suggests that industry expertise is rewarded if the auditor is both the city-specific leader and 
one of the two leading national firms in the industry (Ferguson et al., 2003) or if the auditor is 
the industry leader (DeFond et al., 2000; Francis et al., 2005). Our mixed results are not 
surprising given that firms could expect to receive returns on investments in industry specialist 
expertise whilst competitive pressures could force firms to pass on at least part of the benefits of 
specialization to clients in the form of lower order charges. Moreover, our results have been 
rigorously tested using a larger number of definitions of an industry specialist and a larger panel 
of data than extant studies. Why our results differ from the prior work is not entirely clear. We 
conjecture that the difference is due to industry, cultural and regulatory differences between the 
UK and other countries and/or the slightly different research design used.    
 
7.3 Knowledge Spillovers Tests 
One possible explanation for the Big Firm premium is that it stems from the major firms being 
able to retain knowledge spillovers. This might arise if the Big Firms are able to generate more 
audit revenue, due allowance being made for cross-sectional variations in the drivers of audit 
work, because of operational audit efficiencies they obtain from providing consulting services to 
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those clients.11 Preliminary evidence indicating that this might be happening is provided by an 
untabulated univariate analysis of the data that shows that a larger amount (in terms of money 
value) of NAS fees is generated by Big Firms when the clients are complex and diversified in 
their operations than is obtained by non-Big Firms from simple, undiversified clients. This 
finding must be treated with caution as it might be due to audits of the former being more costly 
to undertake. We therefore fit both OLS and two-stage simultaneous equation regressions 
(models 4 and 5) for the years when NAS fee data are available. The OLS model treats NAS as 
an exogenous determinant of audit fees whereas the simultaneous equations model allows us to 
explore whether the endogeneity of NAS is an issue that has to be taken into account in 
determining the impact of NAS on audit fees.  
The results of the relationships between audit fees, brand name and NAS are presented in 
Table 7. The same control variables were included in both the OLS and the 2SLS specifications 
as were employed in the earlier regressions. We predict that very similar factors that explain the 
magnitude of audit fees will also drive NAS - namely, client size, risk, profitability and 
complexity12. However, while there is reason to believe that clients with financial year-ends that 
fall within the peak period December-March impose greater marginal costs on auditors than 
those with other year-ends, the same does not seem likely to be the case with non-audit 
assignments. Since the demand for NAS seems unlikely to be heavily influenced by the client’s 
financial reporting cycle, we include the same exogenous variables in the LNAS 2SLS equation, 
except we exclude the YE variable. The OLS results imply that the audit revenue elasticity with 
respect to non-audit revenue is 0.138; in other words, an increase in NAS fees of one pound will 
generate extra audit fees of about fourteen pence. However, we find convincing evidence (at the 
p<4% and p<3% levels, respectively) that audit and NAS fees are interrelated using the 
Hausman (1978) exogeneity test, suggesting these results need to be treated with caution. When 
LNAS is estimated as an endogenous variable by fitting a simultaneous equations model, it 
                                                 
11 The unobservability of the costs involved in conducting audits means we are unable to say anything about who 
captures any Big Firm premium.  If Big Firms pay higher salaries then the premium will be shared between the 
partners and the more junior audit staff. 
12 Ezzamel et al. (2002) and Firth (2002) argue that some company specific events generate a demand for 
consultancy services and also require extra auditing. We have carried out untabulated sensitivity checks which 
show that the results of our OLS and simultaneous equation models are not materially different when dummy and 
interaction variables to control for mergers, share issues, the installation of information systems, a new chief 
executive officer and restructuring processes are added. However, one must treat the significant audit-NAS 
relationship and the insignificant event effects with care. Dummies and interaction terms were constructed using 
backdated newspaper and microfiche reports. This analysis was undertaken retrospectively and produced a small 
number of events for the early years of the sample. The lack of variability in the dummy variables in the early years 
could mitigate against more positive results. Furthermore, there is suggestive evidence of a bias towards larger 
companies because they receive a relatively greater share of the total press coverage. The latter factor might be 
important if company specific events that require significantly greater levels of audit effort for small clients are 
unreported in the national press. We thank an anonymous referee for raising these issues.  
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remains a significant factor. If we focus on the two-stage results, the audit revenue elasticity 
with respect to non-audit revenue is 0.151; in other words, an increase in NAS fees of one pound 
will generate extra audit fees of 15 pence. The relationship is much stronger when we consider 
the impact of audit fee income on non-audit fee revenue. There is clear evidence to suggest that 
NAS revenue is a positive function of the level of audit fee income. Moreover, the quantitative 
impact of the LAF coefficient is much greater, an increase in audit revenue from a client of one 
pound generating additional non-audit income of 93 pence. 
 
- Insert Table 7 about here - 
  
The Table 7 results indicate that the Big Firm premium coefficient is not statistically 
significant after controlling for NAS, suggesting Big Firms charge the same price as a small 
audit firm. This is contrary to the result shown in the earlier tables, when no control was 
included for NAS. Taken together, these results imply that the Big Firm premium could be 
partially attributable to the failure to control for NAS. When allowance is made for the 
endogeneity of NAS, the significance of the Big Firm premium declines substantially. However, 
one must interpret this result with a degree of caution because the extent to which NAS might 
proxy for other omitted variables is unclear. We do not investigate this issue in this paper but 
believe that the relationship between NAS and other variables is a valuable avenue for further 
research.   
 
7.4 Monopoly Pricing Tests 
Our models contain control variables for the size of a client that should be the prime factor in 
the determination of the price of an audit. However, size might affect audit fee income in more 
complex ways than is captured by the simple linear specification used in this and earlier studies.  
For example, a Big Firm might be able to charge more than its smaller brethren for auditing a 
large client because the client’s market is more concentrated. We address this possibility by re-
running model 1 for sub-samples partitioned according to the size of the clients. Size 
partitioning across the panel of data is problematic because clients move between quartiles over 
the sample period. We therefore present the results of annual estimations in Table 8. The brand 
name premium is significant for clients from the first quartiles in 1987, 1988, 1994, 1995, 1997-
2000 and 2002. For the second quartile, significant brand name returns are reported in 1989-
1991, 1993, 1997, 1998 and 2001. A significant brand name coefficient is observed in 1985 and 
1992 for the third quartile and in 1987 and 1998 for the fourth quartile. The significant negative 
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brand name coefficient in 2002 for the fourth quartile suggests that the international firms 
charged significantly lower fees than their smaller counterparts. The reasons for this are unclear; 
we conjecture it could be due to price competition for the prestigious blue chip clients that were 
audited by Andersen in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom fiascos. For robustness, we 
estimated a panel regression across the sub-samples of clients that did not move between 
quartiles but the results were not materially different from those reported above. These mixed 
results imply that there is no evidence of systematic anticompetitive pricing and the demand for 
the quality-differentiated services of a reputable accounting firm is greatest for small clients, 
consistent with product differentiation (Anderson and Zeghal, 1994).  
 
- Insert Table 8 about here – 
 
7.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity of the results reported in Tables 3-8 have been tested in a variety of ways. Our 
checks suggest the models are well specified from an econometric perspective. There is no 
evidence that hetroskedasticity is a problem. Likewise, variable exclusion, consideration of a 
different model and prior beliefs about variable estimates (Gujarati 1999) suggest that the results 
are not contaminated by multicollinearity.  
Since the annual regression results could be sensitive to firm-specific events not captured 
by our control variables, we also estimated fixed-effects regressions with dummies for audit 
firms. An important feature of this procedure is that the Brand variable is substituted with 
separate variables for each of the large-, medium- and small-sized firms. Consistent with the Big 
Firm premium evidence reported earlier, we find that the coefficients on the medium and small 
firms are significantly lower than the Big Firm coefficients. We also sequentially exclude 
individual accounting firms from the estimate of model 1 and find results that are consistent 
with our earlier analysis. We find no evidence to suggest that any one particular firm is driving 
the findings reported in this paper.  
In addition to the steps outlined in above, model structure has been further assessed by 
using different proxies for client size, complexity, risk, brand name and industry specialization, 
without the results being materially affected. We flex our industry specialization definitions by 
using steeper 20% and 30% hurdle rates. Although there are fewer specialists, the unreported 
results are not materially different. Likewise, we test the sensitivity of the results reported in 
tables 5 and 6 by excluding each firm and industry sequentially to see if any were driving the 
results. The results were substantially the same.  
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Functional form has further been examined by considering the possibility that brand 
name, size, risk and NAS might interact in complex ways. Audit firms might be able to generate 
more NAS business when the client is particularly large or risky. Big Firms might be 
particularly well placed to provide NAS and their ability to provide such additional services 
might lead to larger audit fees. We include various two-way interactions of auditor type, client 
size, client risk and NAS revenue, but the untabulated results do not support the view that the 
Big Firms charge more the greater the size or risk of the client.  
We acknowledge that our research design could be sensitive to the assumption that 
auditor choice is an exogenous variable. Recent studies argue that clients are not randomly 
assigned to audit firms.13 We control for selection bias using the methodology detailed by 
Maddala (1983). In the first stage, we estimate an auditor choice probit model to compute 
inverse Mill’s ratios (IMR). Following Ireland and Lennox (2002), we believe that the choice of 
audit firm will depend mostly on whether the client is large (LTA) and has diverse overseas 
operations (Foreign). We extend this work by testing whether clients are also drawn to an audit 
firm that can provide additional consultancy services (LNAS).  Let *iy denote the unobservable 
utility of the Big versus non-Big Auditor choice defined by the relationship 
(9)                  
 
where iy =1 if 
*
iy >0 and iy = 0 otherwise.  
The results of our estimation of the auditor choice equation (9) are presented in column 
(1) of Table 9. All of the explanatory variables exhibit the expected sign and are statistically 
significant (p<0.001). These findings imply that clients characterized as relatively larger (LTAi), 
with many overseas subsidiaries (Foreigni) or requiring additional consultancy services (LNASi) 
are more likely to hire a large audit firm than a small audit firm. 
The next step is to separately state audit fee models for large and small firms as follows 
(10)                                      u  ' 1i11101 ++= ii ControlsLAF ββ   
(11)                                      u' 0i01000 ++= ii ControlsLAF ββ   
where for client i iControls  is the same vector of proxies for client size, risk, complexity and the 
opportunity cost of audit labour as used in equation (1) and LAF1i and LAF0i are the natural 
                                                 
13 Ireland and Lennox (2002) find that self-selection among 1,543 listed UK clients is significant and the Big Firm 
premium is twice as large when selectivity is taken into account. Chaney et al. (2004) observe a Big Firm premium 
for 15,255 private UK clients that disappears after controlling for self-selection bias. Furthermore, clients choosing 
Big Firm auditors would have faced higher fees had they chosen a non Big Firm auditor. 
iiiii vLNASForeignLTAy ++++= 3210* γγγγ
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logarithm of the audit fees paid to a large or small audit firm. For each client i, their choice of a 
large or small firm determines whether LAF1i or LAF0i is observed. Unlike equation (1), 
equations (10) and (11) allow the coefficients on the control variables to differ for large and 
small firms (i.e. ).'' 0111 ββ ≠  The results of the large and small audit firm demand equations (10 
and 11) are presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table 9 respectively. The coefficients on the 
control variables are generally consistent with our expectations. The estimate of the Big Firm 
premium ( 0010 ˆˆ expexp ββ − = 14 percent) is similar to the mean of the premia reported in Table 3.   
In the final stage, we control for self-selection bias by estimating audit fee models for 
large and small firms  
(12)                                      e  ' 1i1i1u11101 +++= λσββ ii ControlsLAF   
(13)                                      e  ' 0i0i0u010001 +++= λσββ ii ControlsLAF   
where ]1[ 11i1u == ii yuEλσ  and ]0[ 00i0u == ii yuEλσ control for selection. The IMR ( 1iλ  
and 1iλ ) results from equation (9) are used to allow for selection bias in equations (12) and (13). 
We present the results of these estimations in columns (4) and (5) of Table 9. The coefficients 
on the control variables are generally consistent with our earlier work and the estimate of the 
Big Firm premium increases to 23 percent. The significance of the IMR indicates the importance 
of controlling for selectivity. Consistent with Ireland and Lennox (2002), these results imply 
that studies that fail to control for self-selection bias could underestimate the size of the Big 
Firm premium. The question of whether the Big Firm premium determinants are affected by 
self-selection bias is left for further work. 
 
-Insert Table 9 about here- 
 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
Prior research on audit pricing has found evidence consistent with the claim that the largest audit 
firms charging a premium for their services in a number of countries. However, the evidence 
concerning the UK has been mixed, with some studies reporting a premium and others failing to 
do so. Our study has two distinguishing features. We start by confirming over a greater time 
period than hitherto the finding in prior research that the Big Firms appear to earn an audit fee 
premium, when due allowance is made for factors like the size, complexity and riskiness of a 
client’s business. We add to this earlier work by finding that the premium has eroded in recent 
years.  
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The major contribution of the paper is to examine whether this Big Firm premium is 
associated with omitted factors. We test for these factors using a large panel of data taken from a 
wider time frame than the extant literature and by providing a number of research design 
improvements. This is the first study to find that the Big Firm premium might be associated with 
the provision of NAS to UK audit clients, when proper allowance is made for the fact that the 
pricing of an audit can be affected by non-audit services, and vice versa. We also examine the 
possible role of industry specialization, using a much wider number and variety of measures 
than have been employed in previous studies. We find that the Big Firm premium cannot be 
attributed to specialization at the national level, although there is some evidence of significant 
returns if specialization is defined at the city level. Finally we consider whether the Big Firms 
are colluding over price in the highly concentrated large audit client market. When we partition 
by client size, we find that Big Firm returns are more significant in the small client sector, 
consistent with product differentiation rather than abuse of monopoly power. 
Our study has a number of limitations. The UK is an excellent test site for examining the 
relationship between the pricing of audit and non-audit services provided to audit clients 
because both types of fee have been publicly disclosed for some time. However, the amount the 
auditor receives for non-audit services is not disaggregated into component parts (e.g. special 
investigations, tax advice, corporate recovery, mergers and acquisitions and other management 
advisory services). Changes in various countries concerning the non-audit work that auditors can 
do for their audit clients could make it possible to narrow down the focus in future 
investigations. 
A second limitation is the essentially ad hoc nature of the audit and non-audit pricing 
models used in this and other studies. A better theoretical understanding of the audit production 
function and determinants of NAS fees could enable sharper tests to be made by researchers, 
assuming suitable empirical proxies can be identified.  
Consistent with much of the prior literature, a third limitation is that the models used in 
this study initially assume that auditor choice is exogenous. Our models show that the Big Firm 
premium increased after controlling for self-selection bias. This study has been unable to 
ascertain the extent to which the determinants of the Big Firm premium are affected by self-
selection bias. We believe that this could be a fruitful avenue for further work. 
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Appendix  
The prior literature defines industry specialization using a dichotomous measure of the 
auditors’ sales or fees in an industry, hereinafter DAI (Palmrose, 1986a; Craswell et al., 1995 
and DeFond et al., 2000). The present study extends this prior work in four ways. First, we 
compute continuous and dichotomous measures of specialization to try to capture complexities 
stemming from firms choosing to invest different amounts in the development of specialist 
expertise (Krishnan and Yang, 1998). Second, since small firms might devote significant 
amounts of their resources to one particular industry, we define specialization in terms of the 
audit firm’s share of their portfolio in an industry, hereinafter AFSI, and the audit firm’s 
perceived areas of industry specialization (as advertised on websites and in corporate literature), 
hereinafter AFP. Third, for robustness we estimate three (10%, 20% and 30%) hurdle rates of 
specialization. Finally, we define specialization at both the city-level and national-level 
(Ferguson et al., 2003). In total, we use nine specialist measures. These measures are derived 
from the following variables: 
SALESjik = sales of company j in industry i audited by firm k,  
FEESjik = audit fees of auditor k from company j in industry I,  
CLIENTjik = 1 if company j is in industry i and is audited by auditor k; 0 otherwise 
Ki = number of (listed) companies in industry i. 
Five of the specialist measures are dichotomous indicator variables: 
1. A DAI specialist variable, DDR, that takes the value of 1 if the following two conditions 
hold: (i) the industry contains at least 30 clients and (ii) the aggregate share number of 
the sales of the audit firm’s clients in an industry exceed α = 10% (20%) of the 
industry’s sales revenue. Otherwise DDR is set equal to zero. More precisely: 
If ;1)},()30{( =>∩≥ ikiki DDRSALESSHAREK α otherwise 0=ikDDR , 
where Ki is the number of companies in industry i and 
∑
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. 
DDR is intended to capture settings where becoming an industry specialist might be a 
rational goal for an audit firm (condition one) and where the audit firm’s clients have a 
significant share of the economic activity in that industry (condition two). 
2. A fee-based DAI specialist variable, DDF, that takes the value of 1 if the following two 
conditions hold: (i) the industry contains at least 30 clients and (ii) the audit firm’s share 
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of the audit fees paid by the industry exceeds α = 10% (20%). DDF = 0 otherwise.  More 
precisely 
If ;1)},()30{( =>∩≥ ikiki DFRFEESSHAREK α otherwise 0=ikDFR , where: 
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DDF is intended to capture settings where becoming an industry specialist might be a 
rational goal for an audit firm (condition one) and where the auditor has a substantial 
share of the audit income generated by the industry (condition two). 
3. A revenue-based AFSI specialist variable, DAR, that takes a value of 1 if the following 
two conditions hold: (i) at least α = 20% (30%) of the number of the firm’s clients and 
(ii) α = 20% (30%) of the value of the auditors’ clients’ revenue is from the industry. 
DAR = 0 otherwise. More precisely: 
If ;1)},(%){(% =>∩≥ jkikik DARTSALESCLIENCLIENT αα otherwise 0=jDAR , 
where                                                        
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 DAR is intended to capture settings where the auditor has a large share of its clients from 
the industry (condition one) and the clients are economically significant (condition two). 
4. A fee-based AFSI specialist variable, DAF, that takes a value of 1 if the following two 
conditions hold: (i) at least α = 20% (30%) of the number of the firm’s clients and (ii) α 
= 20% (30%) of the value of the firm’s fees are from the industry. DAF = 0 otherwise. 
More precisely: 
If ;1)},(%){(% =>∩≥ jkikik DARFEESCLIENTCLIENT αα otherwise 0=jDAR , 
where 
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 DAF is intended to capture settings where the auditor has a large share of both its clients 
(condition one) and its audit fee income (condition two) from the industry.  
5. An AFP specialist variable, DFP, that takes a value of 1 if the firm promotes itself as a 
specialist in this industry. DFP = 0 otherwise. 
We also use four corresponding continuous variables of industry specialism: 
1. A revenue-based measure of DAI specialist, CDR: the ratio of the accounting firm’s 
revenue within an industry to the total amount of revenue earned by firms in that 
industry. CDR is a continuous measure based on the share of the total sales revenue of 
that industry attributable to the auditor’s clients: 
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2. A fee-based measure of DAI specialist, CDF: the ratio of the accounting firm’s audit fees 
within an industry to the total amount of audit fees paid by firms in that industry. CDF is 
a continuous measure based on the auditor’s share of the total audit fees paid by 
companies in that industry: 
∑
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
∑ ∑
=
=
= =
J
j K
k
J
j
jik
jik
ik
FEES
FEES
FEESSHARE
1
1 1
. 
3. A revenue-based measure of AFSI specialist, CAR: the ratio of the accounting firm’s 
revenue within an industry to the total amount of revenue earned by the firm’s portfolio 
of clients. CAR is a continuous measure based on the share of the total sales revenue of 
that industry attributable to the auditor’s clients: 
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4. A revenue-based measure of AFSI specialist, CAF: the ratio of the accounting firm’s 
audit fees within an industry to the total amount of audit fees paid by firms in their total 
portfolio of clients. CAF is a continuous measure based on the proportion of its fees that 
are derived from the industry: 
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Table 1  
Summary of the data collection procedure and model specification  
 
 Raw Variable Transformed Variable Data Source 
Dependent variable Audit fees (£’000) Natural log of audit fees (LAF) Datastream 
Dependent variable NAS fees (£’000) Natural log of NAS fees (from 1992) Extel 
Size proxy Total assets (£’M) Natural log of total assets (LTA) Global Vantage 
and Worldscope 
Risk proxy Long term debt (£’M) Long term debt to total assets (DTA) Global Vantage 
and Worldscope 
Risk proxy Earnings before interest 
and tax (£’M) 
Return on investment (ROI) Global Vantage 
and Worldscope 
Risk proxy Operating profit (£’M) Dichotomous variable  (Loss) = 1 if an 
operating loss in any of the prior three 
years; 0 otherwise 
Global Vantage 
and Worldscope 
Risk proxy Net current assets Current Ratio (Current) Global Vantage 
and Worldscope 
Risk proxy Liquid resources Quick Ratio (Quick) Global Vantage 
and Worldscope 
Complexity UK subsidiaries Square root of the number of 
subsidiaries (Sub) 
Stock Exchange 
Yearbook 
Complexity Overseas subsidiaries Foreign subsidiaries to 
total number of subsidiaries (Foreign) 
Stock Exchange 
Yearbook 
Busy period Financial year end Dichotomous variable  (YE) = 1 if 
fiscal year end between December and 
March; 0 otherwise 
Global Vantage 
and Worldscope 
Audit quality Auditor identity Dichotomous variable  (Brand) = 1 if 
auditor is a Big Firm; 0 otherwise 
Stock Exchange 
Yearbook 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
LAF 5.005 4.854 1.261 2.267 9.341
LTA 11.730 11.574 1.674 5.872 18.846
Sub 3.573 3.265 1.889 0.000 14.000
Current 1.592 1.412 0.847 0.015 8.987
Quick 0.966 0.851 0.772 0.012 8.864
DTA 0.132 0.074 0.195 0 3.612
ROI 0.106 0.109 0.123 -1.345 0.692
Foreign 0.254 0.188 0.270 0.000 1.000
YE 0.687 1.000 0.464 0.000 1.000
Loss 0.158 0.000 0.354 0.000 1.000
Brand 0.771 1.000 0.409 0.000 1.000
LNAS 4.479 4.412 1.553 0.000 9.116
 
LAF = natural logarithm of audit fees; LTA= natural logarithm of total assets (£’000); Sub = square root of the 
number of subsidiaries; Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio of current assets less 
stock to current liabilities; DTA = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; YE = 1 if fiscal year end 
between December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; Loss = 1 if operating loss reported in prior 3 years, 0 
otherwise; Brand = 1 if Big Firm auditor, 0 otherwise; LNAS = natural logarithm of non-audit fees. 
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Table 3  
Annual Big Firm premium regressions 
                                            + Brand  + Loss  +Foreign   + YE  +
ROI  +DTA   +Quick   +Current   + Sub  +LTA   +   = 
10987
6543210
εββββ
ββββββαLAF
 
 Intercept
? 
LTA 
+ 
Sub 
+ 
Current
- 
Quick
+ 
DTA 
+ 
ROI 
- 
Foreign 
+ 
YE 
+ 
Loss 
+ 
Brand
+ 
F- 
stat 
R2 Premium 
% 
-3.283 0.619 0.186 -0.030 0.308 0.469 -0.708 0.204 0.104 0.107 0.138 127.81a 0.82 0 1985 
(8.86) (18.21) (7.25) (0.27) (2.13) (0.47) (1.43) (1.21) (1.13) (1.14) (1.55)    
-2.741 0.565 0.212 -0.113 0.058 0.436 -0.369 0.343 0.015 0.012 0.174 139.46a 0.81 19.0 1986 
(7.63) (17.18) (8.05) (1.11) (0.51) (0.75) (0.74) (2.39) (0.16) (0.12) (1.99)    
-2.101 0.494 0.237 0.011 0.030 0.474 -0.191 0.374 0.039 0.088 0.231 116.55a 0.80 26.0 1987 
(6.33) (16.24) (9.46) (0.12) (0.27) (0.88) (0.32) (2.34) (0.48) (0.69) (2.92)    
-2.625 0.556 0.237 -0.059 0.020 0.363 -0.014 0.318 0.075 0.063 0.148 141.97a 0.80 16.0 1988 
(9.17) (21.85) (11.10) (0.76) (0.21) (0.87) (0.03) (2.27) (1.06) (0.53) (2.10)    
-2.510 0.563 0.209 -0.120 0.070 0.497 -0.379 0.235 0.118 0.142 0.148 132.75a 0.80 16.0 1989 
(8.20) (20.86) (9.68) (1.79) (0.83) (1.35) (0.84) (1.57) (1.64) (1.07) (1.97)    
-1.441 0.469 0.238 -0.119 0.030 0.222 -0.027 0.346 0.074 -0.006 0.139 143.21a 0.81 14.9 1990 
(5.10) (18.51) (11.71) (1.98) (0.35) (0.75) (0.06) (2.61) (1.11) (0.04) (2.03)    
-0.949 0.428 0.253 -0.186 0.071 0.229 -0.299 0.439 0.112 0.060 0.162 154.50a 0.80 17.8 1991 
(3.72) (18.41) (13.14) (2.86) (0.85) (0.91) (0.85) (3.59) (1.82) (0.57) (2.46)    
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Intercept
? 
LTA 
+ 
Sub 
+ 
Current
- 
Quick
+ 
DTA 
+ 
ROI 
- 
Foreign 
+ 
YE 
+ 
Loss 
+ 
Brand
+ 
F- 
stat 
R2 Premium 
% 
-0.683 0.396 0.253 -0.081 -0.002 0.349 -0.241 0.522 0.098 0.057 0.185 141.44a 0.80 20.3 1992 
(2.79) (17.32) (12.56) (1.15) (0.01) (1.45) (0.84) (4.28) (1.56) (0.61) (2.70)    
-0.919 0.426 0.242 -0.175 0.087 0.456 -0.119 0.555 0.025 0.137 0.146 177.37a 0.83 15.7 1993 
(4.00) (19.76) (13.00) (2.84) (1.21) (1.94) (0.61) (4.81) (0.41) (1.74) (2.08)    
-0.856 0.431 0.227 -0.180 0.046 0.103 -0.508 0.663 0.063 0.037 0.183 157.40a 0.81 20.1 1994 
(3.65) (19.68) (12.32) (3.28) (0.69) (0.47) (2.04) (5.91) (1.03) (0.45) (2.60)    
-0.952 0.425 0.224 -0.134 0.052 0.098 -0.526 0.655 0.115 0.001 0.168 178.99a 0.84 18.3 1995 
(4.52) (21.00) (13.00) (2.54) (0.82) (0.87) (2.78) (6.45) (2.05) (0.04) (2.46)    
-0.882 0.401 0.214 -0.103 0.043 0.090 -0.511 0.685 0.098 0.014 0.179 163.24a 0.82 19.6 1996 
(3.82) (18.60) (12.14) (2.14) (0.64) (0.81) (2.43) (6.97) (1.75) (0.19) (2.51)    
-0.553 0.391 0.230 -0.246 0.137 0.041 -0.294 0.759 0.148 0.048 0.264 126.82a 0.79 30.2 1997 
(1.48) (11.62) (7.86) (3.61) (1.48) (1.06) (0.75) (4.44) (1.55) (0.60) (2.61)    
-0.844 0.418 0.215 -0.226 0.143 0.044 -0.201 0.576 0.136 0.043 0.292 115.13a 0.84 33.9 1998 
(2.75) (14.56) (8.88) (4.03) (1.76) (0.41) (0.69) (4.25) (1.47) (0.48) (2.88)    
1999 -0.846 0.436 0.187 -0.090 0.042 0.320 -0.603 0.853 0.001 -0.082 0.153 135.35a 0.85 0 
 (2.95) (17.03) (8.38) (2.03) (0.58) (1.83) (2.30) (6.34) (0.02) (0.76) (1.78)    
2000 -0.921 0.423 0.186 -0.105 0.026 0.051 -0.378 0.791 0.047 0.419 0.178 114.88a 0.81 0 
 (2.80) (14.04) (6.80) (2.09) (0.31) (4.12) (1.12) (5.27) (0.47) (2.90) (1.68)    
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
 Intercept 
? 
LTA 
+ 
Sub 
+ 
Current 
- 
Quick 
+ 
DTA 
+ 
ROI 
- 
Foreign 
+ 
YE 
+ 
Loss 
+ 
Brand
+ 
F- 
stat 
R2 Premium 
% 
-1.309 0.496 0.124 -0.292 0.233 -0.032 -0.285 0.793 0.102 0.166 0.145 145.98a 0.85 0 2001 
(3.01) (13.54) (3.65) (2.95) (1.93) (0.10) (0.97) (3.90) (0.78) (0.67) (1.21)    
-1.236 0.461 0.144 -0.134 0.136 0.195 -0.384 0.792 0.188 0.156 0.072 138.22a 0.80 0 2002 
(3.61) (15.36) (5.20) (2.28) (1.43) (0.68) (1.26) (5.02) (1.98) (1.14) (0.62)    
 
a significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level or lower. The first row shows the parameter estimate and the second row the t statistic (two-tailed) for each 
variable. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees. The models are estimated using a dataset of 180 clients across 18 years (3,240 firm-year observations). 
LTA= natural logarithm of total assets (£’000); Sub = square root of the number of subsidiaries; Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio of current 
assets less stock to current liabilities; DTA = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of 
subsidiaries that are foreign operations; YE = 1 if fiscal year end between December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; Loss = 1 if operating loss reported in prior 3 years, 0 
otherwise; Brand = 1 if Big Firm auditor, 0 otherwise.  
Premium = .100)1( 10 ×−βe  Premium is set equal to zero if Brand coefficient is not significant at the 5% level
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Table 4 
Big Firm Premium Time- and Firm- Fixed Effects regression 
                                            Brand02  Brand01   Brand00 
 Brand99  Brand98  +  Brand97  Brand96  Brand95   Brand94  Brand93  Brand92  
 Brand91  Brand90  Brand89  Brand88  Brand87  Brand86  + Brand  + Controls)(  +   = 
191817
161514131211109
876543210
εβββ
ββββββββ
ββββββββα
++++
+++++++
+++++LAF
 
  Panel  Panel Premium  Panel Premium∆
Intercept ? -1.526 Brand + 0.192 21.2 Brand95 ? 0.006 0
  (18.72)  (7.42) Premium∆  (1.54) 
LTA + 0.474 Brand86 ? 0.003 0 Brand96 ? 0.008 0.8
  (63.56)  (0.71)  (2.28) 
Sub + 0.229 Brand87 ? 0.007 0.7 Brand97 ? 0.012 1.2
  (36.48)  (2.07)  (3.02) 
Current - -0.122 Brand88 ? 0.001 0 Brand98 ? 0.013 1.3
  (5.84)  (0.47)  (3.14) 
Quick + 0.056 Brand89 ? 0.001 0 Brand99 ? 0.003 0
  (2.27)  (0.14)  (0.72) 
DTA + 0.135 Brand90 ? 0.006 0 Brand00 ? 0.004 0
  (1.75)  (1.58)  (1.04) 
ROI - -0.372 Brand91 ? 0.005 0 Brand01 ? 0.003 0
  (4.34)  (1.26)  (0.76) 
Foreign + 0.452 Brand92 ? 0.011 1.1 Brand02 ? -0.001 0
  (11.52)  (2.81)  (0.30) 
YE + 0.070 Brand93 ? 0.002 0   
  (3.41)  (0.58) N  3240 
Loss + 0.001 Brand94 ? 0.010 1.0 F  772.28a
  (0.75)  (2.53) R2  0.82 
 
a significant at the 1% level. The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level or lower. 
The first row shows the parameter estimate and the second row the t statistic (two-tailed) for each 
variable. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees.  
 
LTA= natural logarithm of total assets (£’000); Sub = square root of the number of subsidiaries; 
Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio of current assets less stock to 
current liabilities; DTA = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest 
and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; YE = 1 if fiscal 
year end between December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; Loss = 1 if operating loss reported in 
prior 3 years, 0 otherwise; Brand = 1 if Big Firm auditor, 0 otherwise; Brand86 = 1 if Big Firm auditor 
in the year 1986, 0 otherwise; Brand87 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1987, 0 otherwise; Brand88 
= 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1988, 0 otherwise; Brand89 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1989, 
0 otherwise; Brand90 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1990, 0 otherwise; Brand91 = 1 if Big Firm 
auditor in the year 1991, 0 otherwise; Brand92 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1992, 0 otherwise; 
Brand93 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1993, 0 otherwise; Brand94 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the 
year 1994, 0 otherwise; Brand95 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1995, 0 otherwise; Brand96 = 1 if 
Big Firm auditor in the year 1996, 0 otherwise; Brand97 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1997, 0 
otherwise; Brand98 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 1998, 0 otherwise; Brand99 = 1 if Big Firm 
auditor in the year 1999, 0 otherwise; Brand00 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 2000, 0 otherwise; 
Brand01 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the year 2001, 0 otherwise; Brand02 = 1 if Big Firm auditor in the 
year 2002, 0 otherwise. 
 
Premium = .100)1( 2 ×−βe  Premium is set equal to zero if Brand coefficient is not significant at the 
5% level. Premium∆  is the Big Firm – year interaction. This is the change in the Premium relative to 
the 1985 level.   
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Table 5 
Brand name and national industry specialization panel regressions 
.  + Spec BF  + NBFSpec  + Brand  + (Controls) +   = 43210 εββββαLAF  
. + Spec  + Controls)(  +   = 210 εββαLAF  
 
 Brand NBFSpec BFSpec Spec F R2 
 + + + +   
DDF 0.123 0.061 0.038 826.6a 0.82 
 (5.81) (2.36) (1.23)   
DDF  0.063 793.3a 0.79 
  (2.27)   
DDR 0.142 -0.029 771.1a 0.80 
 (6.41) (0.87)   
DDR  0.029 673.2a 0.76 
  (0.83)   
DAF 0.141 0.021 0.024 774.5a 0.80 
 (6.38) (0.77) (0.83)   
DAF  0.031 678.9a 0.77 
  (0.94)   
DAR 0.148 0.050 0.031 796.9a 0.81 
 (6.51) (1.87) (1.07)   
DAR  0.024 678.4a 0.79 
  (0.57)   
DFP 0.144 -0.024 747.9a 0.81 
 (6.43) (0.76)   
DFP  0.054 698.4a 0.81 
  (1.17)   
CDF 0.147 0.028 674.6a 0.78 
 (6.48) (0.91)   
CDR 0.140 0.014 687.9a 0.77 
 (6.32) (0.34)   
CAF 0.138 -0.009 642.5a 0.76 
 (6.27) (0.15)   
CAR 0.142 -0.015 678.6a 0.77 
 (6.40) (0.14)   
a significant at the 1% level. The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level or 
lower. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees.  
 
The same control variables as appear in table 3 are included in the LAF regressions, but for 
conciseness are not reported. The first row shows the parameter estimate and the second row the 
t statistic (two-tailed) for each variable. Brand = 1 if Big Firms auditor = 1, 0 otherwise; 
NBFSpec = Non Big Firms industry specialization variable; BFSpec= Big Firms industry 
specialist variable; Spec = dichotomous industry specialization variable. The definitions of 
industry specialist are explained in detail in the Appendix. 
DDR takes the value of 1 if: (i) the industry contains at least 30 clients and (ii) the number of 
clients in an industry and the firm’s share of the revenue both exceed 10% (20%), 0 otherwise. 
DDF takes the value of 1 if: (i) the industry contains at least 30 clients and (ii) the number of 
clients in an industry and the firm’s share of the fees both exceed 10% (20%), 0 otherwise. DAR 
takes a value of 1 if: (i) at least 20% (30%) of the number of the firm’s clients and (ii) 20% 
(30%) of the value of the firm’s revenue is from the industry, 0 otherwise. DAF takes a value of 
1 if: (i) at least 20% (30%) of the number of the firm’s clients and (ii) 20% (30%) of the value 
of the firm’s fees are from the industry, 0 otherwise. DFP takes a value of 1 if the firm promotes 
itself as a specialist in this industry 0 otherwise. CDR is a continuous measure of the firm’s 
share of revenue in an industry. CDF is a continuous measure of the firm’s share of the audit 
fees in an industry. CAR is a continuous measure of the share of the firm’s revenue from the 
industry. CDF is a continuous measure of the share of the firm’s audit fees from the industry  
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Table 6  
Brand name and city level industry specialization panel regressions 
.  + Spec BF  + NBFSpec  + Brand  + (Controls) +   = 43210 εββββαLAF  
. + Spec  + Controls)(  +   = 210 εββαLAF  
 
 Brand NBFSpec BFSpec Spec F R2 
 + + + +   
DDF 0.130 0.072 0.058 884.3a 0.84 
 (6.20) (2.50) (2.03)   
DDF  0.084 754.2a 0.80 
  (2.59)   
DDR 0.142 0.059 854.1a 0.82 
 (6.41) (2.07)   
DDR  0.031 707.9a 0.79 
  (1.20)   
DAF 0.137 0.038 0.054 865.5a 0.82 
 (6.32) (1.34) (2.01)   
DAF  0.062 748.9a 0.79 
  (2.16)   
DAR 0.132 0.039 0.031 861.7a 0.82 
 (6.28) (1.37) (1.27)   
DAR  0.020 694.2a 0.79 
  (0.97)   
DFP 0.144 0.003 807.9a 0.81 
 (6.43) (0.21)   
DFP  0.004 670.1a 0.77 
  (0.17)   
CDF 0.141 0.018 817.2a 0.80 
 (6.38) (0.81)   
CDR 0.147 0.014 816.2a 0.80 
 (6.49) (0.78)   
CAF 0.148 0.043 832.5a 0.81 
 (6.45) (1.44)   
CAR 0.142 0.056 858.6a 0.82 
 (6.41) (2.05)   
a significant at the 1% level. The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level or 
lower. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees.  
The same control variables as appear in table 3 are included in the LAF regressions, but for 
conciseness are not reported. The first row shows the parameter estimate and the second row 
the t statistic (two-tailed) for each variable. Brand = 1 if Big Firms auditor = 1, 0 otherwise; 
NBFSpec = Non Big Firms industry specialization variable; BFSpec= Big Firms industry 
specialist variable; Spec = dichotomous industry specialization variable. The definitions of 
industry specialist are explained in detail in the Appendix. DDR takes the value of 1 if: (i) the 
industry contains at least 30 clients and (ii) the number of clients in an industry and the firm’s 
share of the revenue both exceed 10% (20%), 0 otherwise. DDF takes the value of 1 if: (i) the 
industry contains at least 30 clients and (ii) the number of clients in an industry and the firm’s 
share of the fees both exceed 10% (20%), 0 otherwise. DAR takes a value of 1 if: (i) at least 
20% (30%) of the number of the firm’s clients and (ii) 20% (30%) of the value of the firm’s 
revenue is from the industry, 0 otherwise. DAF takes a value of 1 if: (i) at least 20% (30%) of 
the number of the firm’s clients and (ii) 20% (30%) of the value of the firm’s fees are from 
the industry, 0 otherwise. DFP takes a value of 1 if the firm promotes itself as a specialist in 
this industry 0 otherwise. CDR is a continuous measure of the firm’s share of revenue in an 
industry. CDF is a continuous measure of the firm’s share of the audit fees in an industry. 
CAR is a continuous measure of the share of the firm’s revenue from the industry. CDF is a 
continuous measure of the share of the firm’s audit fees from the industry  
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Table 7  
Brand name and knowledge spillovers  
OLS and simultaneous equations models 
.    LNAS  Brand +Controls)(  +   = 3210 εβββα ++LAF  
.  LAF   (Controls)     210 εββα +++=LNAS  
 OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable LAF LAF LNAS 
Intercept -1.280 -1.302 -1.438 
 (15.55) (15.98) (18.87) 
LTA 0.419 0.438 0.389 
 (58.19) (61.24) (53.18) 
Sub 0.214 0.216 0.224 
 (33.39) (34.69) (31.08) 
Current -0.106 -0.124 -0.046 
 (5.39) (5.97) (1.52) 
Quick 0.051 0.056 0.028 
 (2.24) (2.28) (1.23) 
DTA 0.147 0.131 0.179 
 (1.86) (1.59) (2.16) 
ROI -0.384 -0.388 -0.303 
 (4.41) (4.51) (3.26) 
Foreign 0.456 0.466 0.354 
 (11.60) (12.08) (9.73) 
YE 0.061 0.028  
 (2.97) (1.24)  
Loss 0.011 0.009 -0.009 
 (0.80) (0.70) (0.67) 
Brand 0.071 0.093 0.079 
 (1.01) (1.55) (1.07) 
LNAS 0.138 0.151  
 (3.97) (4.67)  
LAF   0.886 
   (12.89) 
F 603.21a 862.14a 317.24a 
R2 0.82 0.84 0.77 
   
 a significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level or lower.  
The first row in each panel shows the parameter estimate and the second row the t statistic (two-tailed) 
for each variable.  
LTA= natural logarithm of total assets (£’000); Sub = square root of the number of subsidiaries; 
Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio of current assets less stock to 
current liabilities; DTA = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest 
and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; YE = 1 if fiscal 
year end between December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; Loss = 1 if operating loss reported in 
prior 3 years, 0 otherwise; Brand = 1 if Big Firm auditor, 0 otherwise; LAF = natural logarithm of audit 
fees. LNAS = natural logarithm of non-audit service fees. 
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Table 8  
OLS regressions partitioned by client size 
.   Brand  + (Controls) +   = 210 εββα +LAF  
 
 Smallest quartile Second quartile Third quartile Largest quartile 
 Brand 
(t-stat) 
Adj R2 
(F stat) 
Brand 
(t-stat) 
Adj R2 
(F stat) 
Brand 
(t-stat) 
Adj R2 
(F stat) 
Brand 
(t-stat) 
Adj R2 
(F stat) 
1985 0.006 0.74 0.214 0.59 0.382 0.67 -0.164 0.54 
 (0.04)  (1.36)  (2.34)  (0.69)  
1986 0.116 0.53 0.192 0.58 0.275 0.54 -0.023 0.55 
 (0.68)  (1.36)  (1.37)  (0.09)  
1987 0.274 0.46 0.215 0.54 0.145 0.49 0.542 0.50 
 (1.99)  (1.61)  (0.90)  (2.00)  
1988 0.301 0.53 0.010 0.65 0.076 0.50 0.468 0.51 
 (2.21)  (0.11)  (0.37)  (2.04)  
1989 0.111 0.53 0.204 0.64 0.052 0.41 0.247 0.41 
 (0.98)  (1.99)  (0.32)  (1.04)  
1990 0.041 0.63 0.210 0.60 0.161 0.46 0.398 0.46 
 (0.45)  (2.01)  (0.97)  (1.67)  
1991 0.012 0.58 0.202 0.66 0.165 0.55 0.334 0.45 
 (0.13)  (1.98)  (1.10)  (1.40)  
1992 0.069 0.58 0.115 0.66 0.436 0.52 0.381 0.50 
 (0.81)  (1.07)  (2.95)  (1.39)  
1993 0.033 0.61 0.373 0.60 0.123 0.58 0.258 0.43 
 (0.37)  (3.13)  (0.83)  (1.14)  
1994 0.176 0.67 0.218 0.54 0.236 0.57 0.284 0.51 
 (1.97)  (1.87)  (1.53)  (1.49)  
1995 0.181 0.70 0.137 0.60 0.282 0.59 0.208 0.47 
 (2.07)  (1.23)  (1.75)  (1.54)  
1996 0.165 0.57 0.124 0.46 0.125 0.64 0.058 0.70 
 (1.81)  (0.95)  (0.80)  (0.31)  
1997 0.431 0.60 0.287 0.53 0.147 0.54 0.185 0.69 
 (3.20)  (2.17)  (1.24)  (1.31)  
1998 0.431 0.58 0.315 0.67 0.207 0.51 -0.162 0.75 
 (3.20)  (2.34)  (1.60)  (0.81)  
1999 0.365 0.52 0.122 0.45 0.165 0.66 -0.207 0.74 
 (2.65)  (0.91)  (1.21)  (1.58)  
2000 0.237 0.50 0.187 0.44 0.091 0.70 -0.215 0.69 
 (2.08)  (1.85)  (0.55)  (1.64)  
2001 0.134 0.57 0.462 0.53 0.158 0.67 -0.159 0.69 
 (0.68)  (3.98)  (1.03)  (0.79)  
2002 0.378 0.49 0.246 0.46 0.132 0.64 -0.409 0.76 
 (2.46)  (1.87)  (0.87)  (2.92)  
 
 a significant at the 1% level. The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level or lower. 
    The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees.    
    The same control variables as appear in table 3 are included in the regressions, but for conciseness 
are not reported.  
    The first row shows the parameter estimate and the second row the t statistic (two-tailed) for each 
variable.Brand = 1 if Big Firm auditor, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 9 
Evaluating the Effects of Selection Bias on Audit Fees 
             iiiiii vLNASForeignLTAy ++++= 3210* γγγγ                   
                                     e  ' 1i1i1u11101 +++= λσββ ii ControlsLAF   
                                      e  ' 0i0i0u010001 +++= λσββ ii ControlsLAF   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  yi* LAF1i LAF0i LAF1i LAF0i 
Intercept ? -0.790 ? -0.625 -0.934 -0.527 -1.007 
   (2.03) (3.34) (1.55) (3.42) 
  (0.001) (0.044) (0.001) (0.082) (0.001) 
LTA + 0.128 + 0.430 0.421 0.393 0.408 
   (16.02) (13.79) (15.72) (14.24) 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sub   + 0.191 0.205 0.222 0.263 
   (8.12) (7.67) (8.87) (9.07) 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Current   - -0.250 -0.121 -0.264 -0.087 
   (3.19) (1.02) (3.31) (0.78) 
   (0.001) (0.321) (0.001) (0.473) 
Quick   + 0.196 0.145 0.187 0.076 
   (2.03) (1.12) (1.90) (0.51) 
   (0.046) (0.304) (0.066) (0.610) 
DTA   + 0.284 0.076 0.303 0.081 
   (1.53) (0.64) (2.03) (0.72) 
   (0.127) (0.522) (0.047) (0.508) 
ROI   - -0.810 -0.001 -0.790 -0.020 
   (2.44) (0.07) (2.28) (0.19) 
   (0.001) (0.946) (0.001) (0.904) 
Foreign + 0.264 + 0.787 0.525 0.787 0.528 
   (5.41) (2.01) (5.41) (2.06) 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.049) (0.001) (0.038) 
YE   + 0.022 0.017 0.027 0.009 
   (0.29) (0.19) (0.34) (0.07) 
   (0.769) (0.834) (0.760) (0.893) 
Loss   + 0.129 0.023 0.097 0.46 
   (1.13) (0.23) (0.94) (0.38) 
   (0.260) (0.821) (0.406) (0.796) 
LNAS + 0.245 +  
    
  (0.001)  
i1λ    ?   -0.779  
   (6.01)  
   (0.001)  
i0λ    ?    0.102 
   (1.12) 
   (0.291) 
R2   0.85 0.83 0.85 0.83 
The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level or lower. The first row shows the 
parameter estimate, the second row the t statistic (two-tailed) and the third row the p value.  
LTA= natural logarithm of total assets (£’000); Sub = square root of the number of subsidiaries; 
Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio of current assets less stock to 
current liabilities; DTA = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest 
and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; YE = 1 if fiscal 
year end between December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; Loss = 1 if operating loss reported in 
prior 3 years, 0 otherwise; LNAS = natural logarithm of non-audit service fees; 1iλ  and i0λ are the 
Inverse Mills Ratios used to control for selection bias for large and small audit firms respectively. 
